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Human behavior is comprised of an interaction between intentionally driven actions and reactions to changes in the environment.
Existingdata are equivocal concerning the questionofwhether these two action systems are independent, involve different brain regions,
or overlap. To address this question we investigated whether the degree to which the voluntary action system is activated at the time of
stimulusonsetpredicts reaction times to external stimuli.Werecordedevent-relatedpotentialswhileparticipantspreparedandexecuted
left- or right-hand voluntary actions, whichwere occasionally interrupted by a stimulus requiring either a left- or right-hand response. In
trials where participants successfully performed the stimulus-driven response, increased voluntary motor preparation was associated
with faster responses on congruent trials (where participants were preparing a voluntary action with the same hand that was then
required by the target stimulus), and slower responses on incongruent trials. This suggests that early hand-specific activity in medial
frontal cortex for voluntary action trials can be used by the stimulus-driven system to speed responding. This finding questions the clear
distinction between voluntary and stimulus-driven action systems.
Introduction
Human behavior is often classified into two classes of actions,
reactions to external events and voluntary actions (Haggard,
2008; Passingham et al., 2010), thought to be controlled by dif-
ferent brain systems (Krieghoff et al., 2011). Studies using both
event-related potentials (ERPs) (e.g., Waszak et al., 2005) and
functional imaging (Deiber et al., 1999; Jenkins et al., 2000) sug-
gest that while voluntary actions involve the fronto-median cor-
tex, stimulus-driven actions are controlled via parietal and
premotor cortices (Haggard, 2008). However, monkey studies
show that supplementary motor area (SMA) neurons discharge
to both self-initiated and externally cued movements, indicating
that this region is involved in both types of action (Romo and
Schultz, 1987; Kurata and Wise, 1988).
Importantly, imaging techniques and single-cell recordings
alone may be insufficient to determine the relationship between
voluntary and stimulus-driven motor preparation. A given area
may be composed of different subparts, each being involved in
one type of action. Alternatively, an area, or even a particular cell,
might be involved in both action types but fulfill different func-
tions.Moreover, the increased complexity associatedwith volun-
tary actions confounds any observed differences (Nachev et al.,
2008).
We believe that the only way to truly determine the relation-
ship between voluntary and stimulus-driven actions is to test
whether activity in one system is transferable to the other.We did
so by investigating the performance of the stimulus-driven action
system [measured by reaction times (RTs)] as a function of the
state of the voluntary action system [measured by readiness po-
tential (RP) amplitude]. Participants prepared left- or right-hand
voluntary actions that could be interrupted by a stimulus requir-
ing either a left- or right-hand response, making the response
either congruent or incongruent with concurrent voluntary ac-
tion preparation. We tested whether the amplitude of the RP at
stimulus onset predicted participants’ response time to the stim-
ulus. As discussed below, a similar behavioral task has previously
been used by Obhi et al. (2009a,b).
We tested our results against four hypotheses. First, no asso-
ciation between prestimulus activity and RTs would suggest in-
dependence of the two systems. Second, previous behavioral
studies (e.g., Obhi andHaggard, 2004) show that stimulus-driven
responding is slowed during concurrent voluntary action prepa-
ration, suggesting that not only are the two systems independent
but that inhibitory mechanisms may exist between them. This
conclusion is consistent with observations from patients with
utilization behavior (e.g., Boccardi et al., 2002) who show an
inability to refrain from stimulus-driven actions following SMA
lesions. According to this account, larger prestimulus RPs would
be associated with slower stimulus-driven responses for both
congruent and incongruent trials. Alternatively, any prestimulus
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negativity might reflect general anticipatory processes as indexed
by the contingent negative variation (Walter et al., 1964), leading
to smaller RTs for congruent and incongruent trials. Finally, the
voluntary and stimulus-driven systems might overlap to such a
degree that the preparation of the voluntary action is transferable
to stimulus-driven preparation. If so, RTs should be faster when
voluntary action preparation is more advanced for congruent
trials only, with the opposite pattern for incongruent trials.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Data were collected from 28 paid volunteers. All partici-
pants were right handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
had no history of epilepsy. Individuals who were taking psychoactive
drugs were excluded from participating. Six participants were excluded
from the analysis, as theywere unable to perform the task correctly. These
participants always rated that their planned voluntary action was consis-
tent with the direction required by the imperative stimulus (see below for
details of this rating). Given that these stimuli were not predictable, this
likely reflects a response bias to simply press the same button for the
response and for the question regarding their voluntary action. Four
additional participants were excluded from the analysis described below
because of technical problems with the EEG recording, leaving 10 female
and 8male participants, with amean age of 25 years and 1month (range,
21–31 years). All participants signed an informed consent before the
experimental session and were free to withdraw at any point.
Experimental procedure. The experiment began with a practice phase
where participantswere introduced to the task in stages. The first practice
task was constructed of 80 trials where either a blue or a red square was
presented in the center of the screen on each trial (40 of each, randomly
ordered). Participants were required to make a speeded response to the
squares with a right or left key press, with the stimulus–response map-
ping counterbalanced across participants. This task also served as a base-
line to record participants mean response times to the target stimuli. In
the second practice task, participants were required to perform voluntary
key presses around 1.5 s after the start of each trial, as defined by a 200ms
enlargement of the fixation cross. Participants were instructed that they
could respond with either the left hand (L) or the right hand (R) and that
they should not act in a systematic manner (e.g., L-R-L-R). Instead they
were informed to decide on each trial which button they wanted to press.
They were also informed that they should respond with each hand ap-
proximately equally. Participants received auditory feedback with regard
to the timing of their voluntary actions. One tone signified that they had
responded too quickly (under 1200 ms) and a second tone signified slow
responses (over 2000 ms). This training consisted of 80 trials.
The final task in the practice phase was the experimental task (see Fig.
1). This involved combining the two previous tasks, such that partici-
pants were required tomake voluntary key presses around 1.5 s after trial
onset (voluntary action trials; Fig. 1A). However, on some trials a blue or
red square would appear that would then require them to make the
appropriate stimulus-driven response (target trials; Fig. 1 B). Each block
consisted of 84 trials, of which 54 were voluntary action trials (Fig. 1A)
and 30 were trials where a target stimulus appeared, henceforth referred
to as target trials (Fig. 1B). Target trials were randomly ordered with the
exceptions that they did not occur in the first four trials of each block and
that there were never more than two consecutive target trials. This ran-
dom ordering of target trials ensured that up to the point of target pre-
sentation participantswould not know that a stimuluswould appear, and
therefore voluntary action preparation at the point of stimulus presen-
tation should be similar to the period before a voluntary action. The
timing of the target stimulus was determined relative to the onset of
the action for voluntary action trials, such that it appeared 350ms before
the mean onset of the action for the last 20 voluntary action trials. This
time interval was chosen so that participants should already have begun
preparing a voluntary action on these trials, but they should not be in the
very late stages of action preparation. However, given that the voluntary
action time would also vary from trial to trial, we would likely have trials
where action preparation was more advanced and trials where action
preparation was less advanced. Indeed on some trials, participants made
their voluntary actions before the onset of the target stimulus. On these
trials the target stimulus was no longer presented. This occurred on an
average of 6.6% of all trials where a target stimulus would have been
presented, resulting in amean of fewer than two cancelled target trials per
block. This natural variability should allow us to investigate the associa-
tion between prestimulus voluntary action preparation and stimulus-
driven responding. In addition, the use of a moving average to calculate
the onset of the target stimulus should discourage participants from
waiting to see whether the stimulus would appear before programming
their action, since as their voluntary action times became slower, the
target stimulus would begin to appear later.
Following the response to the target, a white fixation (correct re-
sponse) or red fixation (incorrect response) acted as feedback to the
participants. Following this feedback, participants were required to rate
their voluntary action preparation by answering the following question:
“Before the square appeared, which button were you planning to press?”
They responded with one of four buttons on the response pad with the
following options (from left to right): certain left, maybe left, maybe
right, and certain right. The certain options were to be used when par-
ticipants had confidence in their judgment, while the middle two cate-
gories were to be used if they were not completely sure which button they
had been planning to press.
Following the practice phase, participants were fitted with the EEG
recording caps. Next they completed a short block of the stimulus–
response training (20 trials), followed by one block of the voluntary
actions (80 trials), to reestablish their response rate. Following these
practice tasks they completed 16 blocks of the experimental task. Partic-
ipants continued to receive feedback during the experimental task with
respect to both the accuracy of the target response (visual feedback) and
their voluntary action times (auditory feedback). In addition, at the end
Figure 1. Trial sequence for voluntary action trials (A) and target trials (B). ITI, Intertrial interval; SOA, stimulus onset asynchrony.
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of each block participants were informed about their mean accuracy for
the target stimulus, as well as the number of voluntary actions in the
correct timewindow and the number of voluntary actions producedwith
each hand.
EEG recording and data preprocessing. EEG data were recorded from 63
scalp locations using an EGI system (Electrical Geodesic Inc.). The EEG
was digitized at 500 Hz with a 0.01–200 Hz bandpass filter referenced to
the vertex. EEG analysis was conducted using EEGLAB (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004) and custom-builtMatlab scripts. The datawere resampled
offline to a 250 Hz sample rate, with a notch filter from 45 to 55 Hz to
remove line noise. Epochs were generated from3000 to 1000 ms rela-
tive to stimulus onset, with a 100 ms prestimulus baseline correction for
target trials and a 100 ms pre-action baseline correction for voluntary
action trials. Initial artifact rejection was conducted in a semiautomatic
manner (in EEGLAB) by rejecting epochs with activity above 100 or
below100v, as well as rejecting trials where activity at any time point
for any electrode was more that 5 standard deviations from the mean
activity for that epoch. Any channels that contributed to the rejection of
many epochs were considered for removal and later interpolation. Fron-
tal channels that showed large amplitude blink activity were also ex-
cluded from this first pass of semiautomatic artifact rejection. Ocular
artifact correction was conducted in EEGLAB in Matlab using indepen-
dent component analysis (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Following re-
moval of eye blinks and eyemovements, noisy channels were replaced by
an interpolated weighted average from surrounding electrodes. Data
were then re-referenced to the common average. A final round of semi-
automatic artifact rejection with a threshold of  80 v was used to
remove any remaining artifacts.
To assess prestimulus motor activity, we re-baselined our ERPs to the
100 ms period before the onset of the trial (the large fixation cross). RP
wasmeasured at electrode Cz (electrode 63 on EGI sensor net), with LRP
calculated in line with Coles (1989) using electrodes FC3 (electrode 17)
and FC4 (electrode 54). Analysis on the association between prestimulus
RP/LRP amplitude and RT were calculated by taking the average ampli-
tude in a 100 ms time window before target onset. Since LRP is normally
calculated by taking the average of left- and right-hand responses, we
used a single subtraction for each trial to measure prestimulus motor
lateralization by calculating the activity over the hemisphere contralat-
eral to the response handminus ipsilateral to the response hand.We used
these values to calculate a median split of the RP/LRP amplitude and
extracted mean RTs for the trials either side of the median RP/LRP. All





Mean average voluntary action time was 1529 ms, with a mean
standard deviation of 300 ms. Participants made on average 83%
of their responses within the required time window, with 10.4%
of their responses occurring faster than 1200ms, and the remain-
ing 6.3% occurring later than 2000 ms. This suggests that partic-
ipants were generally able to time their voluntary actions to occur
within the required time period but that there was also some
trial-to-trial variation in the time of their action. This variation is
important to ensure that the target stimulus could appear at vary-
ing levels of voluntary action preparation.
Ratings of voluntary action for target trials
This analysis focuses on how participants responded to the ques-
tion regarding their prepared voluntary action on target trials.
Following their response to the target, participants were asked to
rate, using a four-point scale (certain left, maybe left, maybe
right, certain right), which action they had been preparing before
the onset of the stimulus. Participants were significantly more
likely to rate that theywere sure of their response (82.3%of trials)
than they were to say that they had maybe prepared left or right
(17.7% of trials; t(17)  5.83; p  0.001). Participants appeared
somewhat more inclined to say that the target stimulus required
the same hand response that they were already preparing (43.4%
of trials) rather than the opposite hand (39% of trials). However
this difference was not significant (t(17)  1.75; p  0.1). This
suggests that participants were able to rate their voluntary action
preparation, and on the majority of trials they felt confident
about this judgment. Given the small number of responses in the
middle conditions (maybe left and maybe right), subsequent
analyses were conducted collapsing across the maybe and certain
conditions for responses that were congruent with the prepared
voluntary action (i.e., those trials where participants reported
preparing the same hand action as that required by the target
stimulus) and those that were incongruent. These will henceforth
be referred to as congruent and incongruent trials. Where possi-
ble, behavioral responses from the middle two categories were
also analyzed using a subset of participants (N  9) who had at
least 10 responses in each of these middle categories. Analysis of
ERPs was confined to congruent and incongruent trials (i.e., col-
lapsed across certain and maybe voluntary action ratings), since
only three participants had sufficient responses in themiddle two
categories (20) to produce reliable ERPS.
Responses on target trials
We first plotted the RT distributions for each participant to in-
vestigate the possibility that some responses after the onset of the
target stimulus represented the execution of the voluntary action
rather than a response to the stimulus. Figure 2 shows the RT
distributions for all trials (correct and incorrect) averaged across
all participants for congruent and incongruent trials. The vast
majority of participants showed a strong bimodal distribution
probably reflecting the separation of target responses (with
slower RTs) and the execution of the planned voluntary action
Figure 2. RT distributions in 25ms time windows from 0 to 1000ms for congruent (A), and
incongruent (B) responses averaged across all participants. Values on the y-axis correspond to
the proportion of trials falling in each RT bin, with the x-axis representing RT. The vertical line
represents the mean RT cutoff for separating the two distributions.
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(fast RTs). This bimodality is clearly reflected in the average RT
histograms in Figure 2, A and B. The vertical line represents the
meanRT cutoff, whichwe used to separate these distributions for
each participant. Themean cutoff was 210ms for congruent trials
and 294 ms for incongruent trials. Analysis of accuracy for these
groups of trials revealed a significant interaction between distri-
bution (fast vs slow RTs) and congruency (F(1,17)  956, p 
0.001). Accuracy for trials above the cutoff was significantly
greater for congruent trials (mean accuracy 0.97) as compared
to incongruent trials (mean accuracy  0.94; t(17)  2.9, p 
0.05). However, this difference was much more pronounced for
the fast RT trials (mean accuracy congruent 0.87; mean accu-
racy incongruent 0.0062; t(17) 46.2, p 0.001). This finding
is consistent with the suggestion that trials below the cutoff were
predominantly those where participants performed their volun-
tary action rather than responding to the target stimulus, since
when their voluntary actions were congruent with the target
stimulus, the responsewould be classed as correct. For example, if
participants were preparing a left-hand voluntary action when a
stimulus appeared requiring a left-hand response (a congruent
trial), execution of the voluntary action (a left-handbutton press)
would result in a button press classed as correct with respect to
the target. In contrast those voluntary actions that were executed
on incongruent trials would always lead to an incorrect response,
as highlighted by the fact that almost none of the fast responses to
incongruent trials were correct. In subsequent analysis we di-
vided the data on target trials into “voluntary actions on target
trials,” which are below the RT cutoff, and genuine “target re-
sponses,” which are above the RT cutoff. As described above, this
distinction is justified by the significantly reduced accuracy for
the fast responses on incongruent trials.
This clear separation between the RT distributions for exe-
cuted voluntary actions on target trials and target responses
points to the possibility that participants first check their volun-
tary action preparation and then evaluate the stimulus before
continuing to perform a stimulus-driven action. A number of
previous studies (Obhi and Haggard, 2004; Astor-Jack and Hag-
gard, 2005; Obhi et al., 2009a, 2009b) have shown that RTs in
blocks with concurrent voluntary actions were significantly lon-
ger than responses to the same stimuli in blocks where voluntary
actions were not being prepared. Indeed, in the current experi-
ment RTs in the practice block where participants were only re-
quired to respond to the colored squares were significantly faster
(mean RT  350.4 ms) than RTs for congruent trials in the ex-
perimental blocks (mean RT  474.2 ms) where participants
were also required to perform voluntary actions (t(17) 6.3, p
0.001). This was the case even including those very fast responses
(mean RT 410.5 ms), which were in fact likely not truly stim-
ulus driven (t(17)  3.9, p  0.01). These findings are therefore
consistent with previous studies that suggest that preparation of
voluntary actions impedes speeded responding to an external
stimulus. However, despite an overall cost in RT observed when
switching from a voluntary action to a stimulus-driven action,
this does not rule out the possibility that voluntary action
preparation can be facilitate stimulus-driven responding (as
highlighted in the analysis below). We will return to the pos-
sible mechanisms of the overall RT cost in the general discus-
sion section.
Our subsequent analysis investigated whether the degree to
which participants had prepared their voluntary action influ-
ences the amount of interference in target responding. As out-
lined in the introduction, this was to assess whether activation of
the voluntary action system could be used to improve perfor-
mance of the stimulus-driven system. We first investigated this
behaviorally by using RTs dependent on participants’ ratings of
their voluntary action preparation. This analysis was conducted
using only those trials above the RT cutoff, as these exclude the
trials where participants actually performed their voluntary ac-
tion. A similar filtering of responses was conducted in previous
studies (Astor-Jack andHaggard, 2005; Obhi andHaggard, 2004;
Obhi et al., 2009a, 2009b) where all trials with RTs under 100 ms
were removed. The higher RT cutoff in our study reflects the fact
that participants were performing a choice RT task rather than a
simple RT task.
Analysis of mean correct RTs revealed that responses were
significantly faster for congruent trials (476.5ms) as compared to
incongruent trials (559.9 ms; (t(17)  6.67, p  0.001). We also
found that in the subset of participants who used the middle two
classifications of their voluntary action, RTs were significantly
faster for the completely congruent trials (457.3ms) compared to
the partially congruent trials (540.5ms; t(7) 7.3, p 0.001). For
incongruent trials, this comparison (595.8ms for partially incon-
gruent vs 637.7 ms for incongruent) was not significant (t(7) 
1.77, p 0.1). The direction of these results points to the possi-
bility that more advanced preparation of a voluntary action may
aid responding to an external stimulus that is congruent with the
intended action, providing initial evidence of a possible transfer
of voluntary action preparation to stimulus-driven actions.
Overall, the pattern of behavioral results suggests that partic-
ipants were generally able to respond correctly to the target stim-
ulus despite having already prepared a voluntary action,which on
many occasions was with the opposite hand to that required by
the stimulus. By separating the RT distributions based on their
bimodality, we were able to isolate those trials where participants
genuinely responded to the target stimulus. The congruency of
participants’ voluntary action preparation with the response re-
quired by the target stimulus strongly influenced both their
accuracy and their response time to the target stimulus, such
that they were faster to respond and more accurate on congru-
ent trials. In addition, participants’ own ratings of their aware-
ness of the laterality of their intended response suggests that




To investigate the relationship between voluntary action prepa-
ration and responses to the target stimulus, our ERP analysis
primarily focused on the RP and LRP before the onset of the
stimulus and how these affect RTs to target stimulus. Before dis-
cussing this analysis, we present, in Figure 3, the RP (Fig. 3A) and
LRP (Fig. 3B) for voluntary actions on voluntary action trials. RP
appeared to onset around 1 s before action onset. One-sample t
tests revealed that RP amplitude began to differ from 0 at 964
ms. LRP amplitude began to significantly differ from 0 at 580
ms. These onset times are comparable to other studies where RP
onsets from 1 to 2 s before action (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard
and Eimer, 1999) and LRP onsets around 700 ms before action
(Haggard and Eimer, 1999).
Figure 3C shows the RP prior stimulus onset for target trials.
RPs are plotted separately for trials where participants performed
their planned voluntary action despite the presence of the target
stimulus—as identified by the individual participant RT distri-
bution—and for trials where participants genuinely responded to
the target stimulus itself. For the voluntary actions on target tri-
als, we included both “correct” and “incorrect” responses to
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highlight voluntary action preparation,
since here participants did not respond to
the stimulus but followed their voluntary
preparation. For genuine target re-
sponses, we only included correct re-
sponses to assess the level of voluntary
action preparation that could be success-
fully overridden by the requirement to re-
spond to the stimulus. The RP (averaged
across all conditions) was different to 0
from 664ms before target onset. Since RP
onset in the voluntary action condition
was around 1000 ms before stimulus on-
set, the onset of this RP is consistent with
the fact that the stimulus appeared, on av-
erage, 350 ms before the point at which
participants were planning to perform
their action. ANOVA in the 500ms before
stimulus onset revealed no significant ef-
fect of action type (voluntary actions vs
genuine target responses, F 1) or con-
gruency (F 1) and no significant inter-
action (F 1). This suggests that the size
of the readiness potential at stimulus on-
set did not influence whether participants
aborted their voluntary action and repro-
grammed the stimulus-driven response,
nor did it influence the rating of their vol-
untary action preparation.
Figure 3D shows the LRP before target
onset for congruent and incongruent
trials separately for both genuine target
responses as well as for trials where partic-
ipants executed their voluntary actions.
ANOVA in the 300 ms before stimulus
onset revealed a significant main effect of
congruency (F(1,17)  18.8, p  0.001) as
well as a significant congruency by action
type (voluntary action execution versus
genuine target responses) interaction
(F(1,17) 10.8, p 0.01). This interaction
was driven by the presence of a significant
effect of congruency for trials where par-
ticipants performed their voluntary ac-
tions (t(17)  4.5, p  0.001), but not for
genuine target responses (t(17)  1.1).
This shows that for those trials where par-
ticipants’ hand-specific action prepara-
tion had reached an advanced stage, they
were no longer able to overcome their vol-
untary action to perform the stimulus-driven response. This
finding further validates the division of trials based on their bi-
modality and also shows that participants were genuinely prepar-
ing voluntary actions to be executed around the time that the
stimulus appeared. It is also important to note that the action
occurred several hundred milliseconds earlier for the voluntary
actions on target trials than for the target responses themselves.
As such, this closer proximity to the action onset is reflected in
greater LRPs for these trials. The scalp maps, separated for left-
and right-hand responses (Fig. 3E–J), show a strong central to-
pography for the target responses (Fig. 3G,J), highlighting the
lack of significant lateralized motor activity for these trials. In
contrast, both the voluntary actions on voluntary action trials
(Fig. 3E,H) and the voluntary actions on target trials (Fig. 3F, I)
show a central and contralateral negativity. This lateralization is
predominantlymade upof a contralateral negativity, with little or
no ipsilateral inhibition (positivity) as is often observed with
choice LRPs for stimulus-driven tasks (Meynier et al., 2009). This
could reflect a difference in the balance between contralateral
activation and ipsilateral inhibition between voluntary and stim-
ulus driven actions, or it might reflect a task-specific strategy to
maintain the possibility to switch action at the last moment if
required.
The presence of an LRP difference between voluntary actions
on target trials and target responses despite no difference in the
same comparison for the RP is perhaps somewhat counterintui-
Figure 3. Motor activation before action onset for voluntary action trials (A, B) and stimulus onset for target trials (C, D). A, B,
RP (A) and LRP (B) onset before action onset for voluntary action trials. C, D, RP (C) and LRP (D) before S2 onset (0 ms) for target
trials: Gray lines signify trials where the voluntary action was performed (as identified by individual participant RT distribution),
andblack lines indicate trialswhere participants genuinely responded to the target stimulus. Solid lines indicate trialswhere the S2
stimuluswas congruentwith the intendedvoluntary action, anddashed lines indicate incongruent trials. LRPplotted relative to the
correct response to the target stimulus, such that negative values correspond to activation of the hand required by the target
stimulus. E–J, Topographic plots show ERP amplitude averaged over the 500ms period before action/stimulus onset for left-hand
(E–G) and right-hand actions (H–J ), for voluntary actions on voluntary action trials (E,H ) and on target trials (F, I ) as well as for
target responses (G, J ).
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tive, because if RP amplitude reflectsmotor preparation, how can
the LRP be more advanced while RP suggests that motor prepa-
ration appears to be at the same stage?One possible explanation is
that in some trials participants specified the response hand only
at a very late stage of motor processing, while in other trials they
specified this early in the trial. LRP differences have been previ-
ously reported in the absence of RPmodulation before voluntary
actions (Hughes and Waszak, 2011), suggesting that increased
motor lateralization can occur in the absence of increased gener-
alized motor preparation.
The absence of a significant LRP for the target responses also
suggests that little or noM1 activation was present for those trials
where participants made the stimulus-driven response. Despite
the absence of any laterality, participants were able to rate the
direction of their prepared voluntary response in a meaningful
way (such that it has an effect of RTs and accuracy), suggesting
that some information about the laterality of their response was
present but perhaps had not yet been translated into an action
command in primary motor cortex.
Target responding dependent on motor readiness
Our final analysis investigated the relationship between activa-
tion of the motor system at the time of stimulus onset and par-
ticipants’ response to the target stimulus. Our previous analysis
of motor potentials showed that LRP and not RP amplitude at
stimulus onset was associated with the ability of participants to
successfully overcome their voluntary action. In this analysis
we focus only on these genuine target responses to determine
whether LRP or RP amplitude is associated with accuracy or re-
action times to the target stimulus. Figure 4 shows the RT depen-
dent on LRP and RP amplitude. ANOVA for RTs showed a
significant three-way interaction betweenmeasure (RP/LRP), ac-
tivation (large/small), and congruency, F(1,17)  6.12, p  0.05.
This three-way interaction was driven by a significant interaction
between activation and congruency for RP (F(1,17)  31.2, p 
0.001), but not for LRP (F(1,17)  1.28). For congruent trials a
larger RPwas associatedwith smaller RTs (t(17) 2.51, p 0.05),
while for incongruent trials larger RP was associated with slower
responses (t(17) 2.21, p 0.05).
This finding suggests that increased readiness to make a vol-
untary action, as reflected in RP, speeds reaction time when the
stimulus-driven responses is congruent and slows reaction time
when an incongruent response is required. The corresponding
analysis for accuracy revealed only a significant main effect of
congruency (F(1,17) 31.9, p 0.001), but no bin by congruency
interaction (F(1,17) 2.7) and no three-way interaction (F(1,17)
1.2). The absence of any effects for the LRP amplitude again
highlights that the trials where participants successfully re-
sponded to the target were not associated with significant motor
lateralization.
Since this final analysis was only conducted on a subset of
trials that were determined to have been genuine responses to the
stimuli, it is important to rule out the possibility that this filtering
did not unduly influence this association between prestimulus
motor potentials and reaction times. Therefore, we repeated this
analysis using a fixed reaction time cutoff of 100 ms for both
congruent and incongruent responses rather than the individu-
ally determined cutoffs used in the previous analysis. The results
of this analysis showed a very similar pattern, namely signifi-
cantly faster responses associated with greater RP for congruent
trials (t(17)  2.51, p  0.05), with the opposite association ob-
served for incongruent trials (t(17) 2.22, p 0.05). Indeed, the
observation in the previous analysis that RP amplitude was inde-
pendent of the ability of participants to inhibit their voluntary
action strongly suggests that this important association between
RP amplitude and target RT should be stable regardless of the RT
cutoff employed. Similarly, this also likely rules out the possibility
that the association betweenRP andRT on congruent trials could
be caused by some voluntary action trials being misclassified as
target responses, since these trials would be among the fastest
responses but would not have a significantly larger RP amplitude.
Discussion
The present study investigated the relationship between volun-
tary and stimulus-driven action control. Our aim was to provide
further evidence regarding how these two systems interact and to
assess whether central aspects of themmight overlap in the brain.
To do so, we presented two alternative forced choice stimuli dur-
ing participants’ preparation of a voluntary action with the left-
or right-hand. As a consequence, the external stimulus coded for
one of two responses that could be either congruent or incongru-
ent with participants’ voluntary action preparation. By assessing
both RTs to the forced choice stimulus as well as indices of vol-
untary motor preparation before stimulus presentation, we were
able to analyze stimulus-driven behavior as a function of volun-
tary motor preparation.
In reference to the four possible hypotheses outlined in the
introduction, our results are consistent with a central overlap
between voluntary and stimulus-driven action preparation. We
found that on those trials where participants were able to abort
their voluntary action to make the stimulus-driven response, RP
amplitude at the time of stimulus onset predicted how quickly
participants would respond to the stimulus. More precisely, for
congruent trials increased voluntary action preparation was as-
sociated with faster stimulus-driven responses, whereas for in-
congruent trials large RPs led to slower responses. Since the RP is
normally thought of as a marker of the engagement of voluntary
action mechanisms (Praamstra et al., 1996; Waszak et al., 2005;
Haggard, 2008), this suggests that aspects of voluntary and
Figure 4. RT dependent on prestimulus RP and LRP for congruent (A) and incongruent (B)
trials separately. Error bars show standard error.
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stimulus-driven action preparation overlap in medial frontal
cortex.
Our results are inconsistent with the possibility that activation
of the intentional action system interferes with stimulus-driven
system responding (Astor-Jack and Haggard, 2005), since this
would predict a slowing of RTs for increased voluntary action
preparation even for congruent trials. Furthermore, this hypoth-
esis should predict that advanced voluntary action preparation
should result in reduced accuracy of the stimulus-driven system,
whereas we observed no association between prestimulus RP and
response accuracy. Note that, over and above the dependency of
stimulus-driven RTs on prestimulus RPs described above, we
found that responding of participants to external stimuli was
impeded by the concurrent preparation of voluntary actions, as
shown by increased RTs compared to the choice RT task without
concurrent voluntary action preparation. This replicates previ-
ous findings that have been interpreted in terms of interference
(Obhi andHaggard, 2004; Astor-Jack andHaggard, 2005). How-
ever, our data suggest that the comparison of reaction times in
blocks containing voluntary actions and those with no voluntary
actions may not be indicative of interference between voluntary
and stimulus-driven behavior. Rather, this may simply reflect
differences in attentional demands between the two tasks, such
that participants are able to more efficiently allocate their atten-
tion to the need to make a stimulus-driven response when they
are not concurrently preparing a voluntary action.Moreover, the
negative association between prestimulus negativities and RT for
incongruent trials also strongly argues against a contingent neg-
ative variation explanation for our data. Rather, we suggest that
voluntary action preparation as measured by the RP is partially
transferable to stimulus-driven action preparation.
Our findings are consistent with recent experiments con-
ducted by Obhi and colleagues who showed that switching from
one voluntary action to a different stimulus-driven action (Obhi
et al., 2009a), or to an actionwith a different effector or a different
hand (Obhi et al., 2009b), results in a greater RT cost than switch-
ing to the same action. The additional use of EEG in the present
experiment allowed us to significantly extend these previous
findings by investigating the relationship between the degree of
congruent and incongruent voluntary action preparation and the
speed of stimulus driven responding. This is important because
our behavioral result alone is not sufficient to conclude that vol-
untary action preparation can be transferred to stimulus-driven
reactions, since the slower RT for incongruent trials may reflect
the additional conflict involved in switching not only between
different action types (voluntary and stimulus driven) but also
between different effectors (left- or right-hand actions). Simi-
larly, the increased RT formore advanced incongruent voluntary
action preparationmight also reflect a greater degree of between-
hand conflict. However, the reduced RT for congruent trials
when voluntary action preparation was more advanced strongly
suggests that stimulus-driven action selection can be facilitated
by voluntary action preparation. This latter result is also consis-
tent with the observation of Obhi et al. (2009b) that if a stimulus
appeared in the period immediately before the onset of the
planned voluntary action, then the RT cost is significantly re-
duced. The present study further validates this finding by directly
measuring voluntary action preparation and extends it by showing
an interaction between the degree of congruent and incongruent
voluntary action preparation and the speed of stimulus-driven
responding.
Two more aspects of our results deserve further discussion.
First, analysis of prestimulus motor components on target trials
revealed significant motor lateralization only in trials where par-
ticipants were unable to overcome their voluntary action to per-
form the stimulus-driven response. This suggests that when
voluntary motor preparation has reached this final stage (i.e.,
lateralized preparation), it is too late to interrupt its execution.
The amplitude of the LRP at the point at which a stop signal is
presented has previously been shown to influence participants’
ability to inhibit their response to a go signal (Band and van
Boxtel, 1999; van Boxtel et al. 2001). However, in the stop signal
paradigm participants are typically able to inhibit their response
upon presentation of the stop signal despite the presence of a
significant (albeit smaller) LRP. The lack of significant LRP on
successful target responses in the current experiment may point
toward the possibility that lateralized motor activity resulting
from voluntary action preparation is more difficult to inhibit
than the same level of activity resulting from stimulus-driven
response preparation. The apparent absence of ipsilateral inhibi-
tion in our lateralized motor potentials, previously observed in
choice reaction tasks (e.g., Vidal et al. 2003; Praamstra and Seiss,
2005; Meynier et al., 2009), further suggests that despite using
similar brain systems, voluntary and stimulus-driven actions
may differ in terms of the precise interaction of different pro-
cesses at varying stages of action preparation. Obhi et al. (2009b)
propose that voluntary action preparationmight reflect a balance
between general inhibitory processes and a release of inhibition
for the planned action. This suggestion is difficult to fully assess in
the present study, since activation of different parts of medial
frontal cortex reflecting both preparatory and inhibitory pro-
cesses may contribute toward the activity we measured over cen-
tral electrodes. Future research should attempt to further explore
the role of inhibitory processes in the interaction between volun-
tary and stimulus-driven actions in more detail to build a better
understanding of the precise processes involved in preparing an
action based on an internal representation (such as a goal) and on
an external stimulus.
Second, it was important for our experiment to be able to
determine which voluntary action participants had been prepar-
ing before stimulus onset. We achieved this by asking partici-
pants, at the end of the trial, to rate their voluntary action
preparation. Aside from a small number of participants (who
were excluded from further analysis) who were unable to reliably
classify their action preparation, the majority of participants ap-
peared to be able to meaningfully rate their voluntary response.
Validation of their ratings comes from the significant LRPs for
those fast reactions that were deemed to be the continued execu-
tion of their voluntary action. The observation that the trials
classed as incongruent were responded to more slowly and less
accurately suggests that these subjective ratings were also accu-
rate in trials where participants made genuine stimulus-driven
responses. The preserved ability to introspect on hand-specific
action preparation despite the absence of an LRP for these trials is
perhaps somewhat surprising given previous research strongly
associating LRP with the conscious intention (Haggard and
Eimer, 1999) but is in line with other research associating RP
amplitudewith the conscious experience of intention (Libet et al.,
1983; Lau et al., 2004). In addition, Fried et al. (1991) showed that
direct stimulation of neurons in SMA induces limb-specific in-
tention to perform actions, which at a higher voltage results in a
movement in the same limb. This somatotopic organization of
SMA is consistent with our observation that RP activation is suf-
ficient for allowing participants to introspect on a limb-specific
intention.
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Conclusions
Our data provide evidence that the degree of congruent or incon-
gruent voluntary action preparation at the onset of a target stim-
ulus differentially predicts participants’ RT to the upcoming
stimulus. This shows that the stimulus-driven system can profit
from congruent activation in the voluntary action system, sug-
gesting that the two systems share common central preparatory
mechanisms.
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